Pre-prints & in press
Longin, L. & Deroy, O. (accepted) How artificial intelligence transforms sensory augmentation, Consciousness and cognition
Tuncgenc, B., Newson, M., Sulik, J., Zhao, Y., Dezecache, G., Deroy, O., & El Zein, M. (accepted). Following pandemic guidelines is associated with better wellbeing.
Newson, M., El Zein, M., Sulik, J., Zhao, Y., Dezecache, G., Deroy, O., & Tuncgenc, B. (2021). Digital Contact Does Not Promote Wellbeing, but Face-to-Face Does: A Cross-National Survey During the Covid-19 Pandemic.
Dezecache, G., Dockendorff, M., Ferreiro, D., Deroy. O, & Bahrami, B. (accepted) Democratic forecasting : Small groups predict the future better than crowds, Journal of Applied Experimental Psychology
Battich, L. & Deroy, O. (in press). Implicit influences on perception. Routledge Handbook of Implicit Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 276-288)
Longin, L. (in press). Towards a middle-ground theory of agency for artificial intelligence. In M. Norsov, & J. Seibt (Eds.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications: In Culturally Sustainable Robotics: Proceedings of Robophilosophy 2020 / TRANSOR 2020 (Vol. 313). IOS PRESS.
Longin, L. & Deroy, O. (in press) Representations explain co-perception. In Brogaard, B. (ed.) The Role of Visual Representations,
Lopez, A. (in press). Attention, precision and the Content View, in The Roles of Representation in Visual Perception, B. Brogaard and R. French (eds), Synthese Library Book Series.
2022
Lopez, A. (2022). Vicarious attention, degrees of enhancement nad the contents of consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 3, 1.https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9194
Keshmirian, A., Deroy, O., & Bahrami, B. (2022). Many heads are more utilitarian than one. Cognition, 220, 104965.
Ley-Flores, J., Alshami, E., Singh, A., Bevilacqua, F., Bianchi-Berthouze, N., Deroy, O., & Tajadura-Jiménez, A. (2022). Bodies moving with sound: Effects of pitch and musical sounds on body-representations, PlosOne
2021
Battich, L., Garzorz, I., Wahn, B., & Deroy, O. (2021). The impact of joint attention on the sound-induced flash illusions. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-021-02347-5
Sulik, J., Deroy, O., Dezecache, G., Newson, M., Zhao, Y., El Zein, M., & Tunçgenç, B. (2021). Facing the pandemic with trust in science. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 8(1), 1-10.
Kurvers, R. H. J., Hertz, U., Karpus, J., Balode, M. P., Bertrand, J., Binmore, K., and Bahrami, B. (2021). Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence. iScience 24, 103505. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2021.103505
Karpus, J. and Radzvilas, M. (2021). Game theory and rational reasoning. In: Heilmann, C. and Reiss, J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Routledge, 99–112.
Radzvilas, M. and Karpus, J. (2021). Team reasoning without a hive mind. Research in Economics 75, 345–353.
Karpus, J., Krüger, A., Verba, J. T., Bahrami, B., and Deroy, O. (2021). Algorithm exploitation: humans are keen to exploit benevolent AI. iScience 24, 102679.
Beraldo, S., Karpus, J. (2021). Nudging to donate organs: do what you like or like what we do? Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10007-6
Deroy, Ophelia (2021). Rechtfertigende Wachsamkeit gegenüber KI. In A. Strasser, W. Sohst, R. Stapelfeldt, K. Stepec [eds.]: Künstliche Intelligenz – Die große Verheißung. Series: MoMo Berlin Philosophische KonTexte 8, xenomoi Verlag, Berlin.
Jraissati, Y., & Deroy, O. (2021). Categorizing Smells: A Localist Approach. Cognitive Science, 45(1), e12930. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12930
Rappe, S. (2021). Now, Never, or Coming Soon? Prediction and Efficient Language Processing. Pragmatics & Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.19001.rap
Schmitz, L., Knoblich, G., Deroy, O., & Vesper, C. (2021). Crossmodal correspondences as common ground for joint action. Acta Psychologica, 212, 103222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103222
Tunçgenç, B., El Zein, M., Sulik, J., Newson, M., Zhao, Y., Dezecache, G., & Deroy, O. (2021). Social influence matters: We follow pandemic guidelines most when our close circle does. British Journal of Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12491
Tunçgenç, B., Travers, E. & Fairhurst, M.T. Leadership and tempo perturbation affect coordination in medium-sized groups. Scientific Reports 11, 4940 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-81504-0
2020
Battich, L. and Geurts, B. (2020). Joint attention and perceptual experience. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02602-6
Battich, L., Fairhurst, M. & Deroy, O. (2020). Coordinating attention requires coordinated senses. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 27, 1126–1138. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-020-01766-z
Deroy, O. (2020). Evocation: How mental imagery spans across the senses. In Abraham, A. (ed) The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 276-290). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108580298.018
Dezecache, G., Frith, C. D., & Deroy, O. (2020). Pandemics and the great evolutionary mismatch, Current Biology, 30, 1-3. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2020.04.010
Dowsett, J., Dieterich, M., Taylor, P.C. (2020). Mobile steady-state evoked potential recording: dissociable neural effects of real-world navigation and visual stimulation. Journal of Neuroscience Methods. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2019.108540
Farmer, H., Cataldo, A., Adel, N., Wignall, E., Gallese, V., Deroy, O., … & Ciaunica, A. (2020). The detached self: Investigating the effect of depersonalisation on self-bias in the visual remapping of touch. Multisensory Research, 1(aop), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134808-bja10038
Fernandez Velasco, F. P., Loev, S. Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account. Synthese (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4
Garzorz, I., & Deroy, O. (2020). Why There Is a Vestibular Sense, or How Metacognition Individuates the Senses. Multisensory Research, 1(aop), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134808-bja10026
Navajas, O. Armand, R. Moran, O. Deroy, B. Bahrami (2020). Diversity of opinions and herding behaviour in uncertain crowds, (preregistration) Royal Society Open Science.
Mastropasqua, A., Dowsett, J., Dieterich, M., Taylor, P.C.J. (2020). Right Frontal Eye Field has perceptual and oculomotor functions during optokinetic stimulation and nystagmus. Journal of Neurophysiology. https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00468.2019
Rappe, S. (2020). Brain-Mind [Review of the book Brain-Mind: From Neurons to Consciousness and Creativity, by P. Thagard]. Metapsychology Online Reviews.
Travers, E., Fairhurst, M. & Deroy, O. (2020) Racial bias in face perception is sensitive to instructions but not introspection, Consciousness and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.102952
Research by person
Armand
- J. Navajas, O. Armand, R. Moran, O. Deroy, B. Bahrami (2020). Diversity of opinions and herding behaviour in uncertain crowds, (preregistration) Royal Society Open Science.
Battich
Deroy
Books
- Deroy, O. (under contract). Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. London : Routledge
- O. & Spence, C. (under contract). Crossmodal Correspondences. Oxford : Oxford University Press
- Cheng, T., Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (Eds.). (2019). Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science. London : Routledge
- Deroy, O. (Ed.) (2017). Sensory Blending : On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena. Oxford : Oxford University Press
Journal with peer-review
- Schmitz, L., Knoblich, G., Deroy, O., & Vesper, C. (2021). Crossmodal correspondences as common ground for joint action. Acta Psychologica, 212, 103222.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103222
- Jraissati, Y., & Deroy, O. (2021). Categorizing Smells: A Localist Approach. Cognitive Science, 45(1), e12930.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12930
- Tunçgenç, B., El Zein, M., Sulik, J., Newson, M., Zhao, Y., Dezecache, G., & Deroy, O. (2021). Social influence matters: We follow pandemic guidelines most when our close circle does. British Journal of Psychology.
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12491
- Travers, E., Fairhurst, M. & Deroy, O. (2020) Racial bias in face perception is sensitive to instructions but not introspection, Consciousness and Cognition.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.102952
- Garzorz, I., & Deroy, O. (2020). Why There Is a Vestibular Sense, or How Metacognition Individuates the Senses. Multisensory Research, 1(aop), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134808-bja10026
- Battich, L., Fairhurst, M., & Deroy, O. (2020). Coordinating attention requires coordinated senses. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 1-13.
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-020-01766-z
- Farmer, H., Cataldo, A., Adel, N., Wignall, E., Gallese, V., Deroy, O., … & Ciaunica, A. (2020). The detached self: Investigating the effect of depersonalisation on self-bias in the visual remapping of touch. Multisensory Research, 1(aop), 1-22.
https://doi.org/10.1163/22134808-bja10038
- Dezecache, G., Frith, C. D., & Deroy, O. (2020). Pandemics and the great evolutionary mismatch, Current Biology, 30, 1-3.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2020.04.010
- Deroy, O. (2019). Categorising without concepts. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10, 465-478
- Ciaunica, A., Schilbach, L., & Deroy, O. (2018). The multisensory base of bodily coupling in face-to-face social interactions: Contrasting the case of autism with the Möbius syndrome. Philosophical Psychology, 3, 1162-1187
- Fairhurst, M. T., Travers, E., Hayward, V., & Deroy, O. (2018). Confidence is higher in touch than in vision in cases of perceptual ambiguity. Scientific reports, 8, 1-9
- Tajadura-Jimenez, A., Deroy, O., Marquardt, T., Bianchi-Berthouze, N., Asai, T., Kimura, T., & Kitagawa, N. (2018). Audio-tactile cues from an object’s fall change estimates of one’s body height. PloS one, 13(6)
- Tajadura-Jiménez, A., Vakali, M., Fairhurst, M. T., Mandrigin, A., Bianchi-Berthouze, N., & Deroy, O. (2017). Contingent sounds change the mental representation of one’s finger length. Scientific reports, 7(1), 1-11
- Fairhurst, M. T., & Deroy, O. (2017). Testing the shared spatial representation of magnitude of auditory and visual intensity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 43(3), 629
- Fairhurst, M. T., Scott, M., & Deroy, O. (2017). Voice over: Audio-visual congruency and content recall in the gallery setting. PloS one, 12(6)
- Deroy, O., Spence, C., & Noppeney, U. (2016). Metacognition in multisensory perception. Trends in cognitive sciences, 20, 736-747.
- Parise, C. V., Spence, C., & Deroy, O. (2016). Understanding the correspondences: Introduction to the special issue on crossmodal correspondences. Multisensory research, 29, 1-6
- Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (2016). Lessons of synaesthesia for consciousness: learning from the exception, rather than the general. Neuropsychologia, 88, 49-57
- Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (2016). Crossmodal correspondences: Four challenges. Multisensory research, 29, 29-48
- Deroy, O., Faivre, N., Lunghi, C., Spence, C., Aller, M., & Noppeney, U. (2016). The complex interplay between multisensory integration and perceptual awareness. Multisensory research, 29, 585-606
- Deroy, O., Fasiello, I., Hayward, V., & Auvray, M. (2016). Differentiated audio-tactile correspondences in sighted and blind individuals. Journal of experimental psychology: human perception and performance, 42, 1204-1214
- Fairhurst, M. T., Pritchard, D., Ospina, D., & Deroy, O. (2015). Bouba-Kiki in the plate: combining crossmodal correspondences to change flavour experience. Flavour, 4, 22.
- Tajadura-Jiménez, A., Basia, M., Deroy, O., Fairhurst, M., Marquardt, N., & Bianchi-Berthouze, N. (2015). As light as your footsteps: altering walking sounds to change perceived body weight, emotional state and gait. In Proceedings of the 33rd annual ACM conference on human factors in computing systems (pp. 2943-2952)
- Velasco, C., Woods, A. T., Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (2015). Hedonic mediation of the crossmodal correspondence between taste and shape. Food Quality and Preference, 41, 151-158
- Deroy, O., Reade, B., & Spence, C. (2015). The insectivore’s dilemma, and how to take the West out of it. Food Quality and Preference, 44, 44-55
- Spence, C., Wan, X., Woods, A., Velasco, C., Deng, J., Youssef, J., & Deroy, O. (2015). On tasty colours and colourful tastes? Assessing, explaining, and utilizing crossmodal correspondences between colours and basic tastes. Flavour, 4(1), 23
- Deroy, O., Chen, Y. C., & Spence, C. (2014). Multisensory constraints on awareness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 369(1641), 20130207.
- Deroy, O., Michel, C., Piqueras-Fiszman, B., & Spence, C. (2014). The plating manifesto (I): from decoration to creation. Flavour, 3(1), 6.
- Spence, C., Piqueras-Fiszman, B., Michel, C., & Deroy, O. (2014). Plating manifesto (II): the art and science of plating. Flavour, 3(1), 4
- Deroy, O., Crisinel, A. S., & Spence, C. (2013). Crossmodal correspondences between odors and contingent features: odors, musical notes, and geometrical shapes. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 20, 878-896
- Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (2013). Why we are not all synesthetes (not even weakly so). Psychonomic bulletin & review, 20(4), 643-664
- Spence, C., & Deroy, O. (2013). On the shapes of flavours: A review of four hypotheses. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 10, 207-238
- Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (2013). Are we all born synaesthetic? Examining the neonatal synaesthesia hypothesis. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 37, 1240-1253
- Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (2013). Training, hypnosis, and drugs: artificial synaesthesia, or artificial paradises?. Frontiers in psychology, 4, 660
- Spence, C., & Deroy, O. (2013). How automatic are crossmodal correspondences?. Consciousness and cognition, 22(1), 245-260
- Spence, C., & Deroy, O. (2013). On why music changes what (we think) we taste. i-Perception, 4(2), 137-140
- Woods, A. T., Spence, C., Butcher, N., & Deroy, O. (2013). Fast lemons and sour boulders: Testing crossmodal correspondences using an internet-based testing methodology. i-Perception, 4, 365-379
- Spence, C., & Deroy, O. (2012). Hearing mouth shapes: Sound symbolism and the reverse McGurk effect. i-Perception, 3, 550-552
- Crisinel, A. S., Jacquier, C., Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (2013). Composing with cross-modal correspondences: Music and odors in concert. Chemosensory Perception, 6, 45-52
- Deroy, O. (2013). Object-sensitivity versus cognitive penetrability of perception. Philosophical studies, 162, 87-107
- Deroy, O., & Auvray, M. (2012). Reading the world through the skin and ears: A new perspective on sensory substitution. Frontiers in psychology, 3, 457
- Spence, C., & Deroy, O. (2012). Crossmodal correspondences: Innate or learned?. i-Perception, 3, 316-318
- Deroy, O., & Valentin, D. (2011). Tasting liquid shapes: investigating the sensory basis of cross-modal correspondences. Chemosensory Perception, 4, 80
- Deroy, O. (2010). The Importance of being able: Personal abilities in common sense psychology and cognitive Croatian journal of philosophy, 10, 43-61
Book chapters
- Battich, L. & Deroy, O. (in press). Implicit influences on perception. Routledge Handbook of Implicit Cognition. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press (pp. 276-288)
- Longin, L. & Deroy, O. (in press) Representations explain co-perception. In Brogaard, B. (ed.) The Role of Visual Representations,
- Deroy, Ophelia (2021). Rechtfertigende Wachsamkeit gegenüber KI. In A. Strasser, W. Sohst, R. Stapelfeldt, K. Stepec [eds.]: Künstliche Intelligenz – Die große Verheißung. Series: MoMo Berlin Philosophische KonTexte 8, xenomoi Verlag, Berlin.
- Deroy, O. (2020). Evocation: How mental imagery spans across the senses. In Abraham, A. (ed) The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 276-290)
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108580298.018
- Deroy, O., & Fairhurst, M. (2019). Spatial certainty. In Cheng, T., Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (Eds.). (2019). Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science. London: Routledge
- Deroy, O. (2019) Predictions do not entail cognitive penetration : Racial biases in predictive models of perception. In Limbeck-Lilienau, C., & Stadler, F. (Eds.). (2019). The Philosophy of Perception: Proceedings of the 40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin : De Gruyter & Co (pp. 235-250)
- Ptito, M., Iversen, K., Auvray, M., Deroy, O., & Kupers, R. (2018). Limits of the classical functionalist perspective on sensory substitution. In Macpherson, F. (ed) Sensory substitution, London: British Academy Press
- Deroy, O., Fernandez-Prieto, I., Navarra, J., & Spence, C. (2018). Unravelling the paradox of spatial pitch. In XX (ed) Spatial Biases in Perception and Cognition (pp.77-93)
- Deroy, O., & Spence, C. (2017). Questioning the continuity claim : What difference does consciousness make? In Deroy, O. (Ed.) (2017). Sensory Blending : On synaesthesia and related phenomena. Oxford : Oxford University Press (pp.191-212).
- Deroy, O. (2017). Introduction : Synaesthesia and its neighbours. In Deroy, O. (Ed.) (2017). Sensory Blending : On synaesthesia and related phenomena. Oxford : Oxford University Press
- Deroy, O. (2016). Modularity of perception. In Matthen, M. (ed). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press (pp. 755-778)
- , O. & Auvray, M. (2016). How do synesthetes experience the world? In Matthen, M. (ed). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press
- Deroy, O., & Auvray, M. (2015). A crossmodal perspective on sensory substitution. In Stokes, D., Matthen, M., & Biggs, S. (Eds.). Perception and its Modalities. New York : Oxford University Press (pp. 327-349)
- Deroy, O. (2015). Multisensory perception and cognitive penetration. In Zeimbekis, J., & Raftopoulos, A. (Eds.). The cognitive penetrability of perception: New philosophical perspectives. Oxford: OUP (pp. 144-160)
- Deroy, O. (2014). The unity assumption and the many unities of consciousness. In Bennett, D., Bennett, D. J., & Hill, C. (Eds.). (2014). Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Cambridge : MIT Press (pp.105-124)
- Spence, C., & Deroy, O. (2013). Crossmodal mental imagery. In Lacey, S., & Lawson, R. (Eds.). (2013). Multisensory Imagery. New York : Springer (pp. 157-183).
- Deroy, O. (2013). Synesthesia: An experience of the third kind?. In Brown, R. (ed). Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Dordrecht : Springer(pp. 395-407).
- Deroy, O. (2007). The power of tastes: Reconciling science and subjectivity. In B.C. Smith (ed) Questions of Taste. Oxford : Oxford University Press (pp.122-136)
Book reviews
- Deroy, O. (2017). Review of Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception, by Bence Nanay. Mind, 126 (502), 635-643
- Deroy, O. (2016). Review of Other Minds The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness, by Peter Godfrey-Smith. Science, 354(6316), 1110
- Deroy, O. (2014). Review Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell. Understanding the Feel of Consciousness, by Kevin O’Regan, Dialectica, 68, 473-476
- O. (2010). Worlds Of Truth : A Philosophy of Knowledge, by Israel Sheffler, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 446-448
Wider audience
- Deroy, O. (2020) Five ways of understanding consciousness, Institute of Arts and Ideas Online Magazine, 86 (https://iai.tv/articles/five-approaches-to-understanding-consciousness-auid-1369)
- Deroy, O. (2019). The danger of bursting bubbles : Why informational bubbles are a necessary part of our world. Institute of Arts and Ideas Online Magazine, 83 (https://iai.tv/articles/the-danger-of-bursting-bubbles-auid-1281)
- Deroy, O., & El Zein, M. (2018). Do our brains make us utilitarians?. The Philosophers’ Magazine, 83, 87-93
- Deroy, O. (2017). Why you need to touch your keys. Aeon Online Magazine, https://aeon.co/ideas/why-you-need-to-touch-your-keys-to-believe-theyre-in-your-bag
- Deroy, O. (2015). Eat insects for fun, not to help the environment. Nature, 521(7553), 395
- Deroy, O. (2012). Is there a philosophy of food? Times Literary Supplement, 707
- Deroy, O. (2010). Fermented thoughts. The Philosophers’ Magazine, 48, 104-105
Fairhurst
- Tunçgenç, B., Travers, E. & Fairhurst, M.T. Leadership and tempo perturbation affect coordination in medium-sized groups. Sci Rep 11, 4940 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-81504-0
- Fairhurst M.T., Janata P., Keller P.E. Distinguishing self from other in a dynamic synchronization task with an adaptive virtual partner. Submitted
- Tajadura-Jiménez A., Vakali M., Fairhurst M.T., Mandrigin A., Bianchi-Berthouze N., Deroy O. Auditory Pinocchio: Rising pitch changes the mental representation of one’s finger length. In press
- Fairhurst M. T. Scott M., Deroy O. Matching face-voices pairings affect recall: Evidence from a real-life context. 2017
- Gallotti, M., Fairhurst M. T., Frith, C. Alignment in social interactions. Consciousnes and Cognition 2017
- Fairhurst M.T., Deroy O. Testing the shared spatial representation of magnitude of auditory and visual intensity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 2017
- Koehne, S., Behrends, A.,Fairhurst, M.T., Dziobek, I. Fostering Social Cognition through an Imitation- and Synchronization-Based Dance/Movement Intervention in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Controlled Proof-of-Concept Study. 2016
- Fairhurst, M.T., Pritchard, D., Ospina, D., Deroy, O. Bouba-Kiki in the plate: combining crossmodal correspondences to change flavour experience. Flavour 2015
- van der Steen, M.C., Jacoby, N., Fairhurst, M.T., & Keller, P.E. Sensorimotor synchronization with tempo-changing auditory sequences: Modeling temporal adaptation and anticipation. Brain Research 2015
- Tajadura-Jimenez, A, Basia, M, Deroy, O, Fairhurst, M, Marquardt, Berthouze, N. As light as your footsteps: altering walking sounds to change perceived body weight, emotional state and gait. Computer Human Interface 2015
- Fairhurst, M.T., Löken, L.S., Grossman, T. Physiological and behavioral responses reveal human infants’ sensitivity to pleasant touch. Psychological Science 2014
- Ragert M., Fairhurst M.T., Keller P.E. Segregation and integration of complex auditory streams. PloS One 2014
- Fairhurst M.T., Janata P., Keller P.E. Leading the follower: an fMRI investigation of dynamic cooperativity and leader-follower strategies in synchronization with an adaptive virtual partner. Neuroimage 2013
- Uhlig M., Fairhurst M.T., Keller P.E. The importance of integration and top-down salience when listening to complex multi-part musical stimuli. Neuroimage 2013
- Hove M.J., Fairhurst M.T., Kotz S.A., Keller P.E. Synchronizing with auditory and visual rhythms: an fMRI assessment of modality differences and modality appropriateness. Neuroimage 2012
- Fairhurst M.T., Janata P., Keller P.E. Being and feeling in sync with an adaptive virtual partner: brain mechanisms underlying dynamic cooperativity. Cerebral Cortex 2012
- Fairhurst M., Fairhurst K, Berna Renella C, Tracey I.A. Simulated and physical pain produce overlapping brain network of activity except for posterior insular cortex. Plos One 2012
- Fairhurst M., Wiech K., Dunckley P., Tracey I. Anticipatory brainstem activity predicts neural processing of pain in humans. PAIN 2007
- Fairhurst M.. Neurogenetic Imaging. Book chapter in: Gene Therapy – Prospective assessment in its societal context. Niewohner & Tannert (Eds), Elsevier (pub). 2006.
- Dunckley P., Wise R.G., Fairhurst M., Hobden P., Aziz Q., Chang L., Tracey I. A comparison of visceral and somatic pain processing in the human brainstem using functional magnetic resonance imaging. J Neurosci 2005
Gorman
Karpus
- Team reasoning and a measure of mutual advantage in games (with Mantas Radzvilas), 2018, Economics and Philosophy, 34, pp. 1-30.
- Team reasoning: theory and experiments (with Natalie Gold), 2017, in J. Kiverstein (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind, Routledge, pp. 400-417.
Keshmirian
- Keshmirian, A. , Bahrami,B., Deroy, O. (Under review). Many Heads are More Utilitarian than One.
- Kruschwitz, J., Kausch, A.,Brovkin, A,., Keshmirian, A. , Walter, H. (2019). Self-control is linked to interoceptive inference: craving regulation and the prediction of aversive interoceptive states
induced with inspiratory breathing load. Cognition, Vol 193, 104028.
- Li, L., Kumano, S., Keshmirian, A. , Bahrami, B., Lee, J, Wright, N. (2018). Parsing cultural impacts on regret and risk in Iran, China and the United Kingdom. Scientific Reports , Vol. 8, 13862.
Loev
- Fernandez Velasco, P., Loev, S. Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account. Synthese (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4
Longin
- Longin, L. (In press). Towards a middle-ground theory of agency for artificial intelligence. In M. Norsov, & J. Seibt (Eds.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications: In Culturally Sustainable Robotics: Proceedings of Robophilosophy 2020 / TRANSOR 2020 (Vol. 313). IOS PRESS.
Lopez
- Lopez, A. (in press). Attention, precision and the Content View, in The Roles of Representation in Visual Perception, B. Brogaard and R. French (eds), Synthese Library Book Series, 2020.
- Lopez, A. (2022). Vicarious attention, degrees of enhancement and the contents of consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 3, 1.https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9194
Rappe
- Rappe, S. (2021). Now, Never, or Coming Soon? Prediction and Efficient Language Processing. Pragmatics & Cognition. [view here] https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.19001.rap
- Rappe, S. (2020). Brain-Mind [Review of the book Brain-Mind: From Neurons to Consciousness and Creativity, by P. Thagard]. Metapsychology Online Reviews. [view here]
Sulik
- Motamedi, Y., Little, H., Nielsen, A. & Sulik , J. (2019). The iconicity toolbox: empirical approaches to measuring iconicity. Language and Cognition, 147(11), 1619-1640.
- Sulik & Lupyan G. (2018). Perspective taking in a novel signaling task: effects of world knowledge and contextual constraint. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(11), 1619-1640. Preprint available online: https://psyarxiv.com/ftz94/.
- Sulik (2018). Cognitive mechanisms for inferring the meaning of novel signals during symbolisation. PLOS ONE, 13 (1), e0189540.
- Roberts, S., Micklos, A., Sulik , J. & Little, H. (2018, April). Innovation, selection and the emergence of transparent signals in interaction. In Cuskley, C., Flaherty, M., Little, H., McCrohon, L., Ravignani, A. & Verhoef, T. (Eds.): The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference. Available online: http://evolang.org/ torun/proceedings/papertemplate.html?p=15
- Little, H. & Sulik , J. (2018, April). What do iconicity judgements really mean? In Cuskley, C., Flaherty, M., Little, H., McCrohon, L., Ravignani, A., & Verhoef, T. (Eds.). The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference. Available online: http://evolang.org/torun/proceedings/papertemplate.html?p=67
- Sulik, J. & Lupyan, G. (2018, April). Success in signaling: The effect of feedback to signaler and receiver. In Cuskley, C., Flaherty, M., Little, H., McCrohon, L., Ravignani, A., & Verhoef, T. (Eds.). The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference. Available online: http://evolang.org/torun/proceedings/html?p=151
- Sulik, J. (2018, April). Modeling creativity and communication. In Cuskley, C., Flaherty, M., Little, H., McCrohon, L., Ravignani, A. & Verhoef, T. (Eds.): The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference. Available online: http://evolang.org/torun/proceedings/papertemplate.html?p=153
- Sulik & Lupyan G. (2016). Failures Of Perspective Taking In An Open-ended Signaling Task. In S.G. Roberts, C. Cuskley, L. McCrohon, L. Barceló-Coblijn, O. Feher & T. Verhoef (eds.) The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference. Available online: http://evolang.org/neworleans/papers/103.html
- Lupyan G. & Sulik (2016). The Evolution Of Redundancy In A Global Language. In S.G. Roberts, C. Cuskley, L. McCrohon, L. Barceló-Coblijn, O. Feher & T. Verhoef (eds.) The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference. Available online: http://evolang.org/neworleans/papers/197.html
Wulff Carstensen
- Epistemic Virtues and Underdetermination: When Should We Be Indeterminists? (under review)
- Free Will, Lay-people and Chance: Folk-conceptions are Incompatibilist, But Not Hard Incompatibilist (under review)
Zapata











2022
Ley-Flores, Judith; Alshami, Eslam; Singh, Aneesha; Bevilacqua, Frédéric; Bianchi-Berthouze, Nadia; Deroy, Ophelia; Tajadura-Jiménez, Ana
Bodies moving with sound: Effects of pitch and musical sounds on body-representations Journal Article
In: Nature, Scientific Reports, vol. 12, no. 2676 (2022), 2022, ISSN: ISSN 2045-2322.
@article{Ley-Flores2022,
title = {Bodies moving with sound: Effects of pitch and musical sounds on body-representations},
author = {Judith Ley-Flores and Eslam Alshami and Aneesha Singh and Frédéric Bevilacqua and Nadia Bianchi-Berthouze and Ophelia Deroy and Ana Tajadura-Jiménez},
url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-022-06210-x},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-06210-x},
issn = {ISSN 2045-2322},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-02-17},
urldate = {2022-02-17},
journal = {Nature, Scientific Reports},
volume = {12},
number = {2676 (2022)},
abstract = {The effects of music on bodily movement and feelings, such as when people are dancing or engaged in physical activity, are well-documented—people may move in response to the sound cues, feel powerful, less tired. How sounds and bodily movements relate to create such effects? Here we deconstruct the problem and investigate how different auditory features affect people’s body-representation and feelings even when paired with the same movement. In three experiments, participants executed a simple arm raise synchronised with changing pitch in simple tones (Experiment 1), rich musical sounds (Experiment 2) and within different frequency ranges (Experiment 3), while we recorded indirect and direct measures on their movement, body-representations and feelings. Changes in pitch influenced people’s general emotional state as well as the various bodily dimensions investigated—movement, proprioceptive awareness and feelings about one’s body and movement. Adding harmonic content amplified the differences between ascending and descending sounds, while shifting the absolute frequency range had a general effect on movement amplitude, bodily feelings and emotional state. These results provide new insights in the role of auditory and musical features in dance and exercise, and have implications for the design of sound-based applications supporting movement expression, physical activity, or rehabilitation.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The effects of music on bodily movement and feelings, such as when people are dancing or engaged in physical activity, are well-documented—people may move in response to the sound cues, feel powerful, less tired. How sounds and bodily movements relate to create such effects? Here we deconstruct the problem and investigate how different auditory features affect people’s body-representation and feelings even when paired with the same movement. In three experiments, participants executed a simple arm raise synchronised with changing pitch in simple tones (Experiment 1), rich musical sounds (Experiment 2) and within different frequency ranges (Experiment 3), while we recorded indirect and direct measures on their movement, body-representations and feelings. Changes in pitch influenced people’s general emotional state as well as the various bodily dimensions investigated—movement, proprioceptive awareness and feelings about one’s body and movement. Adding harmonic content amplified the differences between ascending and descending sounds, while shifting the absolute frequency range had a general effect on movement amplitude, bodily feelings and emotional state. These results provide new insights in the role of auditory and musical features in dance and exercise, and have implications for the design of sound-based applications supporting movement expression, physical activity, or rehabilitation.
Lopez, Azenet
Vicarious attention, degrees of enhancement, and the contents of consciousness Journal Article
In: PhiMiSci Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, vol. 3 (2022), 2022, ISSN: 2699-0369.
@article{@article{Lopez_2022,
title = {Vicarious attention, degrees of enhancement, and the contents of consciousness},
author = {Azenet Lopez},
url = {https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/9194},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9194},
issn = {2699-0369},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-01-25},
urldate = {2022-01-25},
journal = {PhiMiSci Philosophy and the Mind Sciences},
volume = {3 (2022)},
abstract = {How are attention and consciousness related? Can we learn what the contents of someone’s consciousness are if we know the targets of their attention? What can we learn about the contents of consciousness if we know the targets of attention? Although introspection might suggest that attention and consciousness are intimately connected, a good body of recent findings in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience brings compelling reasons to believe that they are two separate and independent processes. This paper attempts to bring attention and consciousness back together to make the study of attentional distributions an essential ingredient for the study of the contents of consciousness. My proposal has two main components. First, I introduce a framework for systematizing the relations between attention in its different forms and consciousness in its different forms. Although philosophers and cognitive scientists have repeatedly highlighted the importance of such systematization, most details are still to be worked out. Here I take an initial stab at this project based on the notion of degrees of informational enhancement. Second, I introduce the notion of vicarious attention to account for a kind of additional processing benefit that comes for free when attention is allocated to a target. I then propose that this kind of processing must also be considered when mapping attention targets into contents of consciousness.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
How are attention and consciousness related? Can we learn what the contents of someone’s consciousness are if we know the targets of their attention? What can we learn about the contents of consciousness if we know the targets of attention? Although introspection might suggest that attention and consciousness are intimately connected, a good body of recent findings in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience brings compelling reasons to believe that they are two separate and independent processes. This paper attempts to bring attention and consciousness back together to make the study of attentional distributions an essential ingredient for the study of the contents of consciousness. My proposal has two main components. First, I introduce a framework for systematizing the relations between attention in its different forms and consciousness in its different forms. Although philosophers and cognitive scientists have repeatedly highlighted the importance of such systematization, most details are still to be worked out. Here I take an initial stab at this project based on the notion of degrees of informational enhancement. Second, I introduce the notion of vicarious attention to account for a kind of additional processing benefit that comes for free when attention is allocated to a target. I then propose that this kind of processing must also be considered when mapping attention targets into contents of consciousness.
Longin, Louis; Deroy, Ophelia
Augmenting perception: How artificial intelligence transforms sensory substitution Journal Article
In: Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 99, pp. 103280, 2022.
@article{longin2022augmenting,
title = {Augmenting perception: How artificial intelligence transforms sensory substitution},
author = {Louis Longin and Ophelia Deroy},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810022000125},
doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2022.103280},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-01-01},
urldate = {2022-01-01},
journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
volume = {99},
pages = {103280},
publisher = {Elsevier},
abstract = {What happens when artificial sensors are coupled with the human senses? Using technology to extend the senses is an old human dream, on which sensory substitution and other augmentation technologies have already delivered. Laser tactile canes, corneal implants and magnetic belts can correct or extend what individuals could otherwise perceive. Here we show why accommodating intelligent sensory augmentation devices not just improves but also changes the way of thinking and classifying former sensory augmentation devices. We review the benefits in terms of signal processing and show why non-linear transformation is more than a mere improvement compared to classical linear transformation.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
What happens when artificial sensors are coupled with the human senses? Using technology to extend the senses is an old human dream, on which sensory substitution and other augmentation technologies have already delivered. Laser tactile canes, corneal implants and magnetic belts can correct or extend what individuals could otherwise perceive. Here we show why accommodating intelligent sensory augmentation devices not just improves but also changes the way of thinking and classifying former sensory augmentation devices. We review the benefits in terms of signal processing and show why non-linear transformation is more than a mere improvement compared to classical linear transformation.
Keshmirian, Anita; Deroy, Ophelia; Bahrami, Bahador
Many heads are more utilitarian than one Journal Article
In: Cognition, vol. 220, pp. 104965, 2022.
@article{keshmirian2022many,
title = {Many heads are more utilitarian than one},
author = {Anita Keshmirian and Ophelia Deroy and Bahador Bahrami},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0010027721003887},
doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104965},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-01-01},
urldate = {2022-01-01},
journal = {Cognition},
volume = {220},
pages = {104965},
publisher = {Elsevier},
abstract = {Moral judgments have a very prominent social nature, and in everyday life, they are continually shaped by discussions with others. Psychological investigations of these judgments, however, have rarely addressed the impact of social interactions. To examine the role of social interaction on moral judgments within small groups, we had groups of 4 to 5 participants judge moral dilemmas first individually and privately, then collectively and interactively, and finally individually a second time. We employed both real-life and sacrificial moral dilemmas in which the character's action or inaction violated a moral principle to benefit the greatest number of people. Participants decided if these utilitarian decisions were morally acceptable or not. In Experiment 1, we found that collective judgments in face-to-face interactions were more utilitarian than the statistical aggregate of their members compared to both first and second individual judgments. This observation supported the hypothesis that deliberation and consensus within a group transiently reduce the emotional burden of norm violation. In Experiment 2, we tested this hypothesis more directly: measuring participants' state anxiety in addition to their moral judgments before, during, and after online interactions, we found again that collectives were more utilitarian than those of individuals and that state anxiety level was reduced during and after social interaction. The utilitarian boost in collective moral judgments is probably due to the reduction of stress in the social setting.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Moral judgments have a very prominent social nature, and in everyday life, they are continually shaped by discussions with others. Psychological investigations of these judgments, however, have rarely addressed the impact of social interactions. To examine the role of social interaction on moral judgments within small groups, we had groups of 4 to 5 participants judge moral dilemmas first individually and privately, then collectively and interactively, and finally individually a second time. We employed both real-life and sacrificial moral dilemmas in which the character's action or inaction violated a moral principle to benefit the greatest number of people. Participants decided if these utilitarian decisions were morally acceptable or not. In Experiment 1, we found that collective judgments in face-to-face interactions were more utilitarian than the statistical aggregate of their members compared to both first and second individual judgments. This observation supported the hypothesis that deliberation and consensus within a group transiently reduce the emotional burden of norm violation. In Experiment 2, we tested this hypothesis more directly: measuring participants' state anxiety in addition to their moral judgments before, during, and after online interactions, we found again that collectives were more utilitarian than those of individuals and that state anxiety level was reduced during and after social interaction. The utilitarian boost in collective moral judgments is probably due to the reduction of stress in the social setting.
2021
Schmitz, Laura; Knoblich, Günther; Deroy, Ophelia; Vesper, Cordula
Crossmodal correspondences as common ground for joint action Journal Article
In: Acta Psychologica, vol. 212, no. 103222, 2021.
@article{Schmitz2021,
title = {Crossmodal correspondences as common ground for joint action},
author = {Laura Schmitz and Günther Knoblich and Ophelia Deroy and Cordula Vesper},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103222},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-17},
journal = {Acta Psychologica},
volume = {212},
number = {103222},
abstract = {When performing joint actions, people rely on common ground – shared information that provides the required basis for mutual understanding. Common ground can be based on people's interaction history or on knowledge and expectations people share, e.g., because they belong to the same culture or social class. Here, we suggest that people rely on yet another form of common ground, one that originates in their similarities in multisensory processing. Specifically, we focus on ‘crossmodal correspondences’ – nonarbitrary associations that people make between stimulus features in different sensory modalities, e.g., between stimuli in the auditory and the visual modality such as high-pitched sounds and small objects. Going beyond previous research that focused on investigating crossmodal correspondences in individuals, we propose that people can use these correspondences for communicating and coordinating with others. Initial support for our proposal comes from a communication game played in a public space (an art gallery) by pairs of visitors. We observed that pairs created nonverbal communication systems by spontaneously relying on ‘crossmodal common ground’. Based on these results, we conclude that crossmodal correspondences not only occur within individuals but that they can also be actively used in joint action to facilitate the coordination between individuals.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
When performing joint actions, people rely on common ground – shared information that provides the required basis for mutual understanding. Common ground can be based on people's interaction history or on knowledge and expectations people share, e.g., because they belong to the same culture or social class. Here, we suggest that people rely on yet another form of common ground, one that originates in their similarities in multisensory processing. Specifically, we focus on ‘crossmodal correspondences’ – nonarbitrary associations that people make between stimulus features in different sensory modalities, e.g., between stimuli in the auditory and the visual modality such as high-pitched sounds and small objects. Going beyond previous research that focused on investigating crossmodal correspondences in individuals, we propose that people can use these correspondences for communicating and coordinating with others. Initial support for our proposal comes from a communication game played in a public space (an art gallery) by pairs of visitors. We observed that pairs created nonverbal communication systems by spontaneously relying on ‘crossmodal common ground’. Based on these results, we conclude that crossmodal correspondences not only occur within individuals but that they can also be actively used in joint action to facilitate the coordination between individuals.
Newson, Martha; Zhao, Yi; Zein, Marwa El; Silk, Justin; Dezecache, Guillaume; Deroy, Ophelia; Tunçgenç, Bahar
Digital contact does not promote wellbeing, but face-to-face contact does: A cross-national survey during the COVID-19 pandemic Journal Article
In: Sage journals, vol. OnlineFirst, 2021, ISSN: 1461-7315 (online).
@article{Newson2021,
title = {Digital contact does not promote wellbeing, but face-to-face contact does: A cross-national survey during the COVID-19 pandemic},
author = {Martha Newson and Yi Zhao and Marwa El Zein and Justin Silk and Guillaume Dezecache and Ophelia Deroy and Bahar Tunçgenç},
url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14614448211062164},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448211062164},
issn = {1461-7315 (online)},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-07},
urldate = {2021-12-07},
journal = {Sage journals},
volume = {OnlineFirst},
abstract = {With restricted face-to-face interactions, COVID-19 lockdowns and distancing measures tested the capability of computer-mediated communication to foster social contact and wellbeing. In a multinational sample (n = 6436), we investigated how different modes of contact related to wellbeing during the pandemic. Computer-mediated communication was more common than face-to-face, and its use was influenced by COVID-19 death rates, more so than state stringency measures. Despite its legal and health threats, face-to-face contact was still positively associated with wellbeing, and messaging apps had a negative association. Perceived household vulnerability to COVID-19 reduced the positive effect of face-to-face communication on wellbeing, but surprisingly, people’s own vulnerability did not. Computer-mediated communication was particularly negatively associated with the wellbeing of young and empathetic people. Findings show people endeavored to remain socially connected, yet however, maintain a physical distance, despite the tangible costs to their wellbeing.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
With restricted face-to-face interactions, COVID-19 lockdowns and distancing measures tested the capability of computer-mediated communication to foster social contact and wellbeing. In a multinational sample (n = 6436), we investigated how different modes of contact related to wellbeing during the pandemic. Computer-mediated communication was more common than face-to-face, and its use was influenced by COVID-19 death rates, more so than state stringency measures. Despite its legal and health threats, face-to-face contact was still positively associated with wellbeing, and messaging apps had a negative association. Perceived household vulnerability to COVID-19 reduced the positive effect of face-to-face communication on wellbeing, but surprisingly, people’s own vulnerability did not. Computer-mediated communication was particularly negatively associated with the wellbeing of young and empathetic people. Findings show people endeavored to remain socially connected, yet however, maintain a physical distance, despite the tangible costs to their wellbeing.
Radzvilas, Mantas; Karpus, Jurgis
Team reasoning without a hive mind Journal Article
In: ScienceDirect_Research in Economics, vol. 75, iss. 4, pp. 345-353, 2021.
@article{Radzvilas2021,
title = {Team reasoning without a hive mind},
author = {Mantas Radzvilas and Jurgis Karpus},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1090944321000405?via%3Dihub},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2021.09.003},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-01},
journal = {ScienceDirect_Research in Economics},
volume = {75},
issue = {4},
pages = {345-353},
abstract = {The theory of team reasoning has been developed to resolve a long-lasting niggle in orthodox game theory. Despite its intuitive appeal, the theory has received little attention from mainstream game theorists and economists to date. We believe that this is so because of two theoretic issues, which the theory of team reasoning itself needs to resolve. One of these presents a worry that the theory achieves its explanatory and predictive success by abandoning ontological individualism — a fundamental precept in mainstream economics, including game theory. Here we argue that the theory of team reasoning is compatible with ontological individualism. We show that the core principles of the theory — those that give rise to the above worry — are in fact implicitly assumed in some branches of orthodox game theory itself. We also argue against the methodological approach that construes team reasoning as involving a transformation of the interacting players’ payoffs in modelled games.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The theory of team reasoning has been developed to resolve a long-lasting niggle in orthodox game theory. Despite its intuitive appeal, the theory has received little attention from mainstream game theorists and economists to date. We believe that this is so because of two theoretic issues, which the theory of team reasoning itself needs to resolve. One of these presents a worry that the theory achieves its explanatory and predictive success by abandoning ontological individualism — a fundamental precept in mainstream economics, including game theory. Here we argue that the theory of team reasoning is compatible with ontological individualism. We show that the core principles of the theory — those that give rise to the above worry — are in fact implicitly assumed in some branches of orthodox game theory itself. We also argue against the methodological approach that construes team reasoning as involving a transformation of the interacting players’ payoffs in modelled games.
Sulik, Justin; Deroy, Ophelia; Dezecache, Guillaume; Newson, Martha; Zhao, Yi; Zein, Marwa El; Tunçgenç, Bahar
Facing the pandemic with trust in science Journal Article
In: Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1 - 10, 2021, ISSN: 2662-9992 (Online).
@article{Sulik2021,
title = {Facing the pandemic with trust in science},
author = {Justin Sulik and Ophelia Deroy and Guillaume Dezecache and Martha Newson and Yi Zhao and Marwa El Zein and Bahar Tunçgenç},
url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-021-00982-9},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00982-9},
issn = {2662-9992 (Online)},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-29},
urldate = {2021-11-29},
journal = {Humanities & Social Sciences Communications},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
pages = {1 - 10},
abstract = {Abstract How essential is trust in science to prevent the spread of COVID-19? People who trust in science are reportedly more likely to comply with official guidelines, implying that higher levels of adherence could be achieved by improving trust in science. However, analysis of a global dataset (n = 4341) suggests otherwise. Trust in science had a small, indirect effect on adherence to the rules. Nonetheless, it predicted people’s approval of prevention measures such as social distancing, and bridged political ideology and approval of the measures (conservatives trusted science less and in turn approved of the measures less). These effects were stronger in the USA than in other countries. Even though any increase in trust in science is unlikely to yield strong behavioural changes, given its relationships with both ideology and individuals’ attitudes to the measures, trust in science may be leveraged to yield longer-term sustainable social benefits.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Abstract How essential is trust in science to prevent the spread of COVID-19? People who trust in science are reportedly more likely to comply with official guidelines, implying that higher levels of adherence could be achieved by improving trust in science. However, analysis of a global dataset (n = 4341) suggests otherwise. Trust in science had a small, indirect effect on adherence to the rules. Nonetheless, it predicted people’s approval of prevention measures such as social distancing, and bridged political ideology and approval of the measures (conservatives trusted science less and in turn approved of the measures less). These effects were stronger in the USA than in other countries. Even though any increase in trust in science is unlikely to yield strong behavioural changes, given its relationships with both ideology and individuals’ attitudes to the measures, trust in science may be leveraged to yield longer-term sustainable social benefits.
Kurvers, Ralf H. J. M.; Hertz, Uri; Karpus, Jurgis; Balode, Marta P.; Bertrand, Jayles; Binmore, Ken; Bahrami, Bahador
Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence Journal Article
In: iScience, vol. 24, iss. 12, no. 103505, 2021.
@article{Kurvers2021,
title = { Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence},
author = {Ralf H.J.M. Kurvers and Uri Hertz and Jurgis Karpus and Marta P. Balode and Jayles Bertrand and Ken Binmore and Bahador Bahrami},
url = {https://www.cell.com/iscience/fulltext/S2589-0042(21)01476-0?_returnURL=https%3A%2F%2Flinkinghub.elsevier.com%2Fretrieve%2Fpii%2FS2589004221014760%3Fshowall%3Dtrue},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2021.103505},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-26},
urldate = {2021-11-26},
journal = {iScience},
volume = {24},
number = {103505},
issue = {12},
abstract = {Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple influencers competing for it. We study which strategy maximizes social influence under competition. Applying game theory to a scenario where two advisers compete for the attention of a client, we find that the rational solution for advisers is to communicate truthfully when favored by the client, but to lie when ignored. Across seven pre-registered studies, testing 802 participants, such a strategic adviser consistently outcompeted an honest adviser. Strategic dishonesty outperformed truth-telling in swaying individual voters, the majority vote in anonymously voting groups, and the consensus vote in communicating groups. Our findings help explain the success of political movements that thrive on disinformation, and vocal underdog politicians with no credible program.
},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple influencers competing for it. We study which strategy maximizes social influence under competition. Applying game theory to a scenario where two advisers compete for the attention of a client, we find that the rational solution for advisers is to communicate truthfully when favored by the client, but to lie when ignored. Across seven pre-registered studies, testing 802 participants, such a strategic adviser consistently outcompeted an honest adviser. Strategic dishonesty outperformed truth-telling in swaying individual voters, the majority vote in anonymously voting groups, and the consensus vote in communicating groups. Our findings help explain the success of political movements that thrive on disinformation, and vocal underdog politicians with no credible program.
Karpus, Jurgis; Krüger, Adrian; Verba, Julia Tovar; Bahrami, Bahador; Deroy, Ophelia
Algorithm exploitation: Humans are keen to exploit benevolent AI Journal Article
In: iScience, vol. 24, iss. 6, no. 102679, 2021.
@article{nokey,
title = {Algorithm exploitation: Humans are keen to exploit benevolent AI},
author = {Jurgis Karpus and Adrian Krüger and Julia Tovar Verba and Bahador Bahrami and Ophelia Deroy},
url = {https://www.cell.com/iscience/fulltext/S2589-0042(21)00647-7?_returnURL=https%3A%2F%2Flinkinghub.elsevier.com%2Fretrieve%2Fpii%2FS2589004221006477%3Fshowall%3Dtrue},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2021.102679},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-06-25},
urldate = {2021-06-25},
journal = {iScience},
volume = {24},
number = {102679},
issue = {6},
abstract = {We cooperate with other people despite the risk of being exploited or hurt. If future artificial intelligence (AI) systems are benevolent and cooperative toward us, what will we do in return? Here we show that our cooperative dispositions are weaker when we interact with AI. In nine experiments, humans interacted with either another human or an AI agent in four classic social dilemma economic games and a newly designed game of Reciprocity that we introduce here. Contrary to the hypothesis that people mistrust algorithms, participants trusted their AI partners to be as cooperative as humans. However, they did not return AI's benevolence as much and exploited the AI more than humans. These findings warn that future self-driving cars or co-working robots, whose success depends on humans' returning their cooperativeness, run the risk of being exploited. This vulnerability calls not just for smarter machines but also better human-centered policies.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
We cooperate with other people despite the risk of being exploited or hurt. If future artificial intelligence (AI) systems are benevolent and cooperative toward us, what will we do in return? Here we show that our cooperative dispositions are weaker when we interact with AI. In nine experiments, humans interacted with either another human or an AI agent in four classic social dilemma economic games and a newly designed game of Reciprocity that we introduce here. Contrary to the hypothesis that people mistrust algorithms, participants trusted their AI partners to be as cooperative as humans. However, they did not return AI's benevolence as much and exploited the AI more than humans. These findings warn that future self-driving cars or co-working robots, whose success depends on humans' returning their cooperativeness, run the risk of being exploited. This vulnerability calls not just for smarter machines but also better human-centered policies.
Beraldo, Sergio; Karpus, Jurgis
Nudging to donate organs: do what you like or like what we do? Journal Article
In: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, vol. 24, pp. 329 - 340, 2021.
@article{Beraldo2022,
title = {Nudging to donate organs: do what you like or like what we do?},
author = {Sergio Beraldo and Jurgis Karpus},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11019-021-10007-6},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10007-6},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-03-17},
urldate = {2022-03-17},
journal = {Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy},
volume = {24},
pages = {329 - 340},
abstract = {An effective method to increase the number of potential cadaveric organ donors is to make people donors by default with the option to opt out. This non-coercive public policy tool to influence people’s choices is often justified on the basis of the as-judged-by-themselves principle: people are nudged into choosing what they themselves truly want. We review three often hypothesized reasons for why defaults work and argue that the as-judged-by-themselves principle may hold only in two of these cases. We specify further conditions for when the principle can hold in these cases and show that whether those conditions are met is often unclear. We recommend ways to expand nationwide surveys to identify the actual reasons for why defaults work and discuss mandated choice policy as a viable solution to many arising conundrums.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
An effective method to increase the number of potential cadaveric organ donors is to make people donors by default with the option to opt out. This non-coercive public policy tool to influence people’s choices is often justified on the basis of the as-judged-by-themselves principle: people are nudged into choosing what they themselves truly want. We review three often hypothesized reasons for why defaults work and argue that the as-judged-by-themselves principle may hold only in two of these cases. We specify further conditions for when the principle can hold in these cases and show that whether those conditions are met is often unclear. We recommend ways to expand nationwide surveys to identify the actual reasons for why defaults work and discuss mandated choice policy as a viable solution to many arising conundrums.
Tunçgenç, Bahar; Travers, Eoin; Fairhurst, Merle T.
Leadership and tempo perturbation affect coordination in medium-sized groups Journal Article
In: Scientific Reports, vol. 11, iss. 4940, 2021.
@article{Tunçgenç2021b,
title = {Leadership and tempo perturbation affect coordination in medium-sized groups},
author = {Bahar Tunçgenç and Eoin Travers and Merle T. Fairhurst},
url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-81504-0},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-81504-0},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-03-02},
journal = {Scientific Reports},
volume = {11},
issue = {4940},
abstract = {In marching bands, sports, dance and virtually all human group behaviour, we coordinate our actions with others. Coordinating actions in time and space can act as a social glue, facilitating bonding among people. However, much of our understanding about coordination dynamics is based on research into dyadic interactions. Little is known about the nature of the sensorimotor underpinnings and social bonding outcomes of coordination in medium-sized groups—the type of groups, in which most everyday teamwork takes place. In this study, we explored how the presence of a leader and an unexpected perturbation influence coordination and cohesion in a naturalistic setting. In groups of seven, participants were instructed to walk in time to an auditory pacing signal. We found that the presence of a reliable leader enhanced coordination with the target tempo, which was disrupted when the leader abruptly changed their movement tempo. This effect was not observed on coordination with the group members. Moreover, participants’ perceptions of being a follower and group cooperativeness increased in the presence of a leader. This study extends our knowledge about coordination beyond previous work on dyads. We discuss our results in light of sensorimotor coupling and social cohesion theories of coordination in groups.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In marching bands, sports, dance and virtually all human group behaviour, we coordinate our actions with others. Coordinating actions in time and space can act as a social glue, facilitating bonding among people. However, much of our understanding about coordination dynamics is based on research into dyadic interactions. Little is known about the nature of the sensorimotor underpinnings and social bonding outcomes of coordination in medium-sized groups—the type of groups, in which most everyday teamwork takes place. In this study, we explored how the presence of a leader and an unexpected perturbation influence coordination and cohesion in a naturalistic setting. In groups of seven, participants were instructed to walk in time to an auditory pacing signal. We found that the presence of a reliable leader enhanced coordination with the target tempo, which was disrupted when the leader abruptly changed their movement tempo. This effect was not observed on coordination with the group members. Moreover, participants’ perceptions of being a follower and group cooperativeness increased in the presence of a leader. This study extends our knowledge about coordination beyond previous work on dyads. We discuss our results in light of sensorimotor coupling and social cohesion theories of coordination in groups.
Deroy, Ophelia
Rechtfertigende Wachsamkeit gegenüber KI Book Chapter
In: Strasser, Anna; Sohst, Wolfgang; Stepec, Katja; Stapelfeldt, Ralf (Ed.): vol. 8, xenomoi Verlag, Berlin, 2021, ISBN: 978-3-942106-79-5 (9783942106795).
@inbook{Deroy2021,
title = {Rechtfertigende Wachsamkeit gegenüber KI},
author = {Ophelia Deroy
},
editor = {Anna Strasser and Wolfgang Sohst and Katja Stepec and Ralf Stapelfeldt},
isbn = {978-3-942106-79-5 (9783942106795)},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-02-20},
urldate = {2021-02-20},
volume = {8},
publisher = {xenomoi Verlag, Berlin},
series = {MoMo Berlin KonTexte - Philosophische Schriftenreihe },
abstract = {Der Untertitel dieses Bandes "Die große Verheißung" ist im Grunde eine Frage: Was stellt die Künstliche Intelligenz der Menschheit insgesamt in Aussicht? Was macht sie als zunächst nur technische Möglichkeit zur vielfach gepriesenen Hoffnung? In welcher Hinsicht sind solche Hoffnungen überhaupt erfüllbar und nicht vielmehr die ersten Zeichen einer bevorstehenden Apokalypse?
Die Faszination der Künstlichen Intelligenz liegt offenbar in dem Versprechen des kühnsten aller bisher in der Menschheitsgeschichte unternommenen Versuchs, sich als Spezies selbst zu übersteigen. In den öffentlichen Debatten wird das Projekt der Künstlichen Intelligenz oft als fundamentaler dargestellt, als all die Abenteuer, neue Kontinente zu entdecken, bleierne Materie alchemistisch in leuchtendes Gold zu verwandeln oder durch mechanische Maschinenmonster buchstäblich neue Welten aus dem Boden zu stampfen. Damit scheint sie als Zeichen und Zepter einer Allmacht, die vormals nur den Göttern zugetraut wurde, verstanden zu werden.
Eine solche Überhöhung des Projektes der Künstlichen Intelligenz wirft einige Fragen auf. Mit dem vorliegenden Band wollen wir einige subtilere Perspektiven beisteuern, die über das allgemeine Bejubeln und Verteufeln hinausgehen. Das Unternehmen Künstliche Intelligenz hat offenbar einige konzeptionelle Risse, die hier allgemeinverständlich untersucht werden sollen. Die in diesem Band versammelten Betrachtungen treffen den Nerv einer Zeit, die im globalen Kontext gegen vielfach sich aufdrängende politische Verzweiflung und drohende soziale Verwirrung ankämpfen muss. Die Künstliche Intelligenz ist hier nur eine von sehr vielen Bemühungen um eine neue Ordnung unter den Menschen, wenn auch eine besonders prominente. In der Auseinandersetzung mit ihr kann die philosophische Reflexion das leisten, was die fachliche Spezialkompetenz oft außer Acht lässt, nämlich die übergreifende Zusammenführung von Perspektiven, Anregungen, Bedenken und Korrekturen drohender Irrtümer.
Ebenso stellen sich neue grundlegende ethische Fragen, wenn man über die zukünftige Entwicklung von Künstlicher Intelligenz nachdenkt. Geht das Projekt Künstliche Intelligenz mit drastischen Veränderungen bezüglich unseres Verständnisses von Vertrauen, Freundschaft und Selbstbestimmung einher, oder können wir zukünftige Entwicklungen gestalten?
Schon begrifflich ist die Annäherung an das, was unter Künstlicher Intelligenz verstanden wird oder werden sollte, ein kontroverses Feld. Welche Art von Intelligenz - analytische, soziale oder emotionale - ist gemeint, welche Vorrausetzungen haben die vielen Begriffe von Intelligenz, welche Konsequenzen dürfen wir aus ihnen ziehen? Und welchen Wesen oder Entitäten können wir welche Arten der Intelligenz plausiblerweise zuschreiben?
Als Herausgeber*innen dieses Bandes freuen wir uns, dass unser Ruf nach Beiträgen auf großes und positives Echo gestoßen ist. Die Relevanz des Gegenstandes dieses Buches zeigt sich auch daran, in welchem Umfang sehr bekannte Stimmen dieses Diskurses bereit waren, sich an einem solchen Projekt zu beteiligen. In diesem Sinne sind wir froh, auch Beiträge von Autoren wie Daniel Dennett, Ophelia Deroy, Sybille Krämer, Dieter Mersch, Catrin Misselhorn oder Wolfgang Zimmerli gewonnen zu haben. Unser besonderes Anliegen, eine im Einzelnen interdisziplinäre Debatte fortsetzen zu können, deren verbindende methodische Klammer der philosophische Diskurs ist, wird aber erst durch die Gesamtheit der versammelten Aufsätze erfüllt. In diesem Sinne hoffen wir, zur gegenwärtigen Beurteilung der Chancen und Risiken, aber auch der gesellschaftlichen Reichweite von Künstlicher Intelligenz weiteres, wertvolles Material beisteuern zu können.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Der Untertitel dieses Bandes "Die große Verheißung" ist im Grunde eine Frage: Was stellt die Künstliche Intelligenz der Menschheit insgesamt in Aussicht? Was macht sie als zunächst nur technische Möglichkeit zur vielfach gepriesenen Hoffnung? In welcher Hinsicht sind solche Hoffnungen überhaupt erfüllbar und nicht vielmehr die ersten Zeichen einer bevorstehenden Apokalypse?
Die Faszination der Künstlichen Intelligenz liegt offenbar in dem Versprechen des kühnsten aller bisher in der Menschheitsgeschichte unternommenen Versuchs, sich als Spezies selbst zu übersteigen. In den öffentlichen Debatten wird das Projekt der Künstlichen Intelligenz oft als fundamentaler dargestellt, als all die Abenteuer, neue Kontinente zu entdecken, bleierne Materie alchemistisch in leuchtendes Gold zu verwandeln oder durch mechanische Maschinenmonster buchstäblich neue Welten aus dem Boden zu stampfen. Damit scheint sie als Zeichen und Zepter einer Allmacht, die vormals nur den Göttern zugetraut wurde, verstanden zu werden.
Eine solche Überhöhung des Projektes der Künstlichen Intelligenz wirft einige Fragen auf. Mit dem vorliegenden Band wollen wir einige subtilere Perspektiven beisteuern, die über das allgemeine Bejubeln und Verteufeln hinausgehen. Das Unternehmen Künstliche Intelligenz hat offenbar einige konzeptionelle Risse, die hier allgemeinverständlich untersucht werden sollen. Die in diesem Band versammelten Betrachtungen treffen den Nerv einer Zeit, die im globalen Kontext gegen vielfach sich aufdrängende politische Verzweiflung und drohende soziale Verwirrung ankämpfen muss. Die Künstliche Intelligenz ist hier nur eine von sehr vielen Bemühungen um eine neue Ordnung unter den Menschen, wenn auch eine besonders prominente. In der Auseinandersetzung mit ihr kann die philosophische Reflexion das leisten, was die fachliche Spezialkompetenz oft außer Acht lässt, nämlich die übergreifende Zusammenführung von Perspektiven, Anregungen, Bedenken und Korrekturen drohender Irrtümer.
Ebenso stellen sich neue grundlegende ethische Fragen, wenn man über die zukünftige Entwicklung von Künstlicher Intelligenz nachdenkt. Geht das Projekt Künstliche Intelligenz mit drastischen Veränderungen bezüglich unseres Verständnisses von Vertrauen, Freundschaft und Selbstbestimmung einher, oder können wir zukünftige Entwicklungen gestalten?
Schon begrifflich ist die Annäherung an das, was unter Künstlicher Intelligenz verstanden wird oder werden sollte, ein kontroverses Feld. Welche Art von Intelligenz - analytische, soziale oder emotionale - ist gemeint, welche Vorrausetzungen haben die vielen Begriffe von Intelligenz, welche Konsequenzen dürfen wir aus ihnen ziehen? Und welchen Wesen oder Entitäten können wir welche Arten der Intelligenz plausiblerweise zuschreiben?
Als Herausgeber*innen dieses Bandes freuen wir uns, dass unser Ruf nach Beiträgen auf großes und positives Echo gestoßen ist. Die Relevanz des Gegenstandes dieses Buches zeigt sich auch daran, in welchem Umfang sehr bekannte Stimmen dieses Diskurses bereit waren, sich an einem solchen Projekt zu beteiligen. In diesem Sinne sind wir froh, auch Beiträge von Autoren wie Daniel Dennett, Ophelia Deroy, Sybille Krämer, Dieter Mersch, Catrin Misselhorn oder Wolfgang Zimmerli gewonnen zu haben. Unser besonderes Anliegen, eine im Einzelnen interdisziplinäre Debatte fortsetzen zu können, deren verbindende methodische Klammer der philosophische Diskurs ist, wird aber erst durch die Gesamtheit der versammelten Aufsätze erfüllt. In diesem Sinne hoffen wir, zur gegenwärtigen Beurteilung der Chancen und Risiken, aber auch der gesellschaftlichen Reichweite von Künstlicher Intelligenz weiteres, wertvolles Material beisteuern zu können.
Rappe, Sofiia
Now, never, or coming soon? Prediction and efficient language processing Journal Article
In: Pragmatics & Cognition, vol. 26, iss. 2-3, pp. 357-385, 2021.
@article{Rappe2021,
title = {Now, never, or coming soon? Prediction and efficient language processing},
author = {Sofiia Rappe},
url = {https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.19001.rap},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.19001.rap},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-02-12},
urldate = {2021-02-12},
journal = {Pragmatics & Cognition},
volume = {26},
issue = {2-3},
pages = {357-385},
abstract = {The general principles of perceptuo-motor processing and memory give rise to the Now-or-Never bottleneck constraint imposed on the organization of the language processing system. In particular, the Now-or-Never bottleneck demands an appropriate structure of linguistic input and rapid incorporation of both linguistic and multisensory contextual information in a progressive, integrative manner. I argue that the emerging predictive processing framework is well suited for the task of providing a comprehensive account of language processing under the Now-or-Never constraint. Moreover, this framework presents a stronger alternative to the Chunk-and-Pass account proposed by Christiansen and Chater (2016), as it better accommodates the available evidence concerning the role of context (in both the narrow and wider senses) in language comprehension at various levels of linguistic representation. Furthermore, the predictive processing approach allows for treating language as a special case of domain-general processing strategies, suggesting deep parallels with other cognitive processes such as vision.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The general principles of perceptuo-motor processing and memory give rise to the Now-or-Never bottleneck constraint imposed on the organization of the language processing system. In particular, the Now-or-Never bottleneck demands an appropriate structure of linguistic input and rapid incorporation of both linguistic and multisensory contextual information in a progressive, integrative manner. I argue that the emerging predictive processing framework is well suited for the task of providing a comprehensive account of language processing under the Now-or-Never constraint. Moreover, this framework presents a stronger alternative to the Chunk-and-Pass account proposed by Christiansen and Chater (2016), as it better accommodates the available evidence concerning the role of context (in both the narrow and wider senses) in language comprehension at various levels of linguistic representation. Furthermore, the predictive processing approach allows for treating language as a special case of domain-general processing strategies, suggesting deep parallels with other cognitive processes such as vision.
Tunçgenç, Bahar; Zein, Marwa El; Sulik, Justin; Newson, Martha; Zhao, Yi; Dezecache, Guillaume; Deroy, Ophelia
Social influence matters: We follow pandemic guidelines most when our close circle does Journal Article
In: British Journal of Psychology, vol. 112, iss. 3, pp. 763-780, 2021.
@article{Tunçgenç2021,
title = {Social influence matters: We follow pandemic guidelines most when our close circle does},
author = {Bahar Tunçgenç and Marwa El Zein and Justin Sulik and Martha Newson and Yi Zhao and Guillaume Dezecache and Ophelia Deroy},
url = {https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bjop.12491},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12491},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-20},
journal = {British Journal of Psychology},
volume = {112},
issue = {3},
pages = {763-780},
abstract = {Why do we adopt new rules, such as social distancing? Although human sciences research stresses the key role of social influence in behaviour change, most COVID-19 campaigns emphasize the disease’s medical threat. In a global data set (n = 6,675), we investigated how social influences predict people’s adherence to distancing rules during the pandemic. Bayesian regression analyses controlling for stringency of local measures showed that people distanced most when they thought their close social circle did. Such social influence mattered more than people thinking distancing was the right thing to do. People’s adherence also aligned with their fellow citizens, but only if they felt deeply bonded with their country. Self-vulnerability to the disease predicted distancing more for people with larger social circles. Collective efficacy and collectivism also significantly predicted distancing. To achieve behavioural change during crises, policymakers must emphasize shared values and harness the social influence of close friends and family.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Why do we adopt new rules, such as social distancing? Although human sciences research stresses the key role of social influence in behaviour change, most COVID-19 campaigns emphasize the disease’s medical threat. In a global data set (n = 6,675), we investigated how social influences predict people’s adherence to distancing rules during the pandemic. Bayesian regression analyses controlling for stringency of local measures showed that people distanced most when they thought their close social circle did. Such social influence mattered more than people thinking distancing was the right thing to do. People’s adherence also aligned with their fellow citizens, but only if they felt deeply bonded with their country. Self-vulnerability to the disease predicted distancing more for people with larger social circles. Collective efficacy and collectivism also significantly predicted distancing. To achieve behavioural change during crises, policymakers must emphasize shared values and harness the social influence of close friends and family.
Jraissati, Yasmina; Deroy, Ophelia
Categorizing Smells: A Localist Approach Journal Article
In: Cognitive Science_A Multidisciplinary Journal, vol. 45, iss. 1, no. e12930, 2021.
@article{nokey,
title = {Categorizing Smells: A Localist Approach},
author = {Yasmina Jraissati and Ophelia Deroy},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.12930},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12930},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-03},
journal = {Cognitive Science_A Multidisciplinary Journal},
volume = {45},
number = {e12930},
issue = {1},
abstract = {Humans are poorer at identifying smells and communicating about them, compared to other sensory domains. They also cannot easily organize odor sensations in a general conceptual space, where geometric distance could represent how similar or different all odors are. These two generalities are more or less accepted by psychologists, and they are often seen as connected: If there is no conceptual space for odors, then olfactory identification should indeed be poor. We propose here an important revision to this conclusion: We believe that the claim that there is no odor space is true only if by odor space, one means a conceptual space representing all possible odor sensations, in the paradigmatic sense used for instance for color. However, in a less paradigmatic sense, local conceptual spaces representing a given subset of odors do exist. Thus the absence of a global odor space does not warrant the conclusion that there is no olfactory conceptual map at all. Here we show how a localist account provides a new interpretation of experts and cross-cultural categorization studies: Rather than being exceptions to the poor olfactory identification and communication usually seen elsewhere, experts and cross-cultural categorization are here taken to corroborate the existence of local conceptual spaces.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Humans are poorer at identifying smells and communicating about them, compared to other sensory domains. They also cannot easily organize odor sensations in a general conceptual space, where geometric distance could represent how similar or different all odors are. These two generalities are more or less accepted by psychologists, and they are often seen as connected: If there is no conceptual space for odors, then olfactory identification should indeed be poor. We propose here an important revision to this conclusion: We believe that the claim that there is no odor space is true only if by odor space, one means a conceptual space representing all possible odor sensations, in the paradigmatic sense used for instance for color. However, in a less paradigmatic sense, local conceptual spaces representing a given subset of odors do exist. Thus the absence of a global odor space does not warrant the conclusion that there is no olfactory conceptual map at all. Here we show how a localist account provides a new interpretation of experts and cross-cultural categorization studies: Rather than being exceptions to the poor olfactory identification and communication usually seen elsewhere, experts and cross-cultural categorization are here taken to corroborate the existence of local conceptual spaces.
Battich, Lucas; Garzorz, Isabelle; Wahn, Basil; Deroy, Ophelia
The impact of joint attention on the sound-induced flash illusions Journal Article
In: Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, vol. 83, no. 8, pp. 3056–3068, 2021.
@article{battich2021impact,
title = {The impact of joint attention on the sound-induced flash illusions},
author = {Lucas Battich and Isabelle Garzorz and Basil Wahn and Ophelia Deroy},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13414-021-02347-5},
doi = {10.3758/s13414-021-02347-5},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-01},
urldate = {2021-01-01},
journal = {Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics},
volume = {83},
number = {8},
pages = {3056--3068},
publisher = {Springer},
abstract = {Humans coordinate their focus of attention with others, either by gaze following or prior agreement. Though the effects of joint attention on perceptual and cognitive processing tend to be examined in purely visual environments, they should also show in multisensory settings. According to a prevalent hypothesis, joint attention enhances visual information encoding and processing, over and above individual attention. If two individuals jointly attend to the visual components of an audiovisual event, this should affect the weighing of visual information during multisensory integration. We tested this prediction in this preregistered study, using the well-documented sound-induced flash illusions, where the integration of an incongruent number of visual flashes and auditory beeps results in a single flash being seen as two (fission illusion) and two flashes as one (fusion illusion). Participants were asked to count flashes either alone or together, and expected to be less prone to both fission and fusion illusions when they jointly attended to the visual targets. However, illusions were as frequent when people attended to the flashes alone or with someone else, even though they responded faster during joint attention. Our results reveal the limitations of the theory that joint attention enhances visual processing as it does not affect temporal audiovisual integration.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Humans coordinate their focus of attention with others, either by gaze following or prior agreement. Though the effects of joint attention on perceptual and cognitive processing tend to be examined in purely visual environments, they should also show in multisensory settings. According to a prevalent hypothesis, joint attention enhances visual information encoding and processing, over and above individual attention. If two individuals jointly attend to the visual components of an audiovisual event, this should affect the weighing of visual information during multisensory integration. We tested this prediction in this preregistered study, using the well-documented sound-induced flash illusions, where the integration of an incongruent number of visual flashes and auditory beeps results in a single flash being seen as two (fission illusion) and two flashes as one (fusion illusion). Participants were asked to count flashes either alone or together, and expected to be less prone to both fission and fusion illusions when they jointly attended to the visual targets. However, illusions were as frequent when people attended to the flashes alone or with someone else, even though they responded faster during joint attention. Our results reveal the limitations of the theory that joint attention enhances visual processing as it does not affect temporal audiovisual integration.
2020
Farmer, Harry; Cataldo, Antonio; Adel, Nagela; Wignall, Emma; Gallese, Vittorio; Deroy, Ophelia; Hamilton, Antonia; Ciaunica, Anna
The Detached Self: Investigating the Effect of Depersonalisation on Self-Bias in the Visual Remapping of Touch Journal Article
In: Multisensory Research, vol. 1, pp. 1-22, 2020.
@article{Farmer2020,
title = {The Detached Self: Investigating the Effect of Depersonalisation on Self-Bias in the Visual Remapping of Touch},
author = {Harry Farmer and Antonio Cataldo and Nagela Adel and Emma Wignall and Vittorio Gallese and Ophelia Deroy and Antonia Hamilton and Anna Ciaunica},
url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/msr/34/4/article-p365_2.xml},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/22134808-bja10038},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-10-14},
journal = {Multisensory Research},
volume = {1},
pages = {1-22},
abstract = {There is a growing consensus that our most fundamental sense of self is structured by the ongoing integration of sensory and motor information related to our own body. Depersonalisation (DP) is an intriguing form of altered subjective experience in which people report feelings of unreality and detachment from their sense of self. The current study used the visual remapping of touch (VRT) paradigm to explore self-bias in visual–tactile integration in non-clinical participants reporting high and low levels of depersonalisation experiences. We found that the high-DP group showed an increased overall VRT effect but a no-self-face bias, instead showing a greater VRT effect when observing the face of another person. In addition, across all participants, self-bias was negatively predicted by the occurrence of anomalous body experiences. These results indicate disrupted integration of tactile and visual representations of the bodily self in those experiencing high levels of DP and provide greater understanding of how disruptions in multisensory perception of the self may underlie the phenomenology of depersonalisation.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There is a growing consensus that our most fundamental sense of self is structured by the ongoing integration of sensory and motor information related to our own body. Depersonalisation (DP) is an intriguing form of altered subjective experience in which people report feelings of unreality and detachment from their sense of self. The current study used the visual remapping of touch (VRT) paradigm to explore self-bias in visual–tactile integration in non-clinical participants reporting high and low levels of depersonalisation experiences. We found that the high-DP group showed an increased overall VRT effect but a no-self-face bias, instead showing a greater VRT effect when observing the face of another person. In addition, across all participants, self-bias was negatively predicted by the occurrence of anomalous body experiences. These results indicate disrupted integration of tactile and visual representations of the bodily self in those experiencing high levels of DP and provide greater understanding of how disruptions in multisensory perception of the self may underlie the phenomenology of depersonalisation.
Battich, Lucas; Fairhurst, Merle T.; Deroy, Ophelia
Coordinating attention requires coordinated senses Journal Article
In: Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, vol. 27, pp. 1126-1138, 2020.
@article{nokey,
title = {Coordinating attention requires coordinated senses},
author = {Lucas Battich and Merle T. Fairhurst and Ophelia Deroy},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13423-020-01766-z},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-020-01766-z},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-07-14},
journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin & Review},
volume = {27},
pages = {1126-1138},
abstract = {From playing basketball to ordering at a food counter, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attention with others towards a common focus: we look at the ball, or point at a piece of cake. This non-verbal coordination of attention plays a fundamental role in our social lives: it ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language, understand each other’s mental states, and coordinate our actions. Models of joint attention generally attribute this accomplishment to gaze coordination. But are visual attentional mechanisms sufficient to achieve joint attention, in all cases? Besides cases where visual information is missing, we show how combining it with other senses can be helpful, and even necessary to certain uses of joint attention. We explain the two ways in which non-visual cues contribute to joint attention: either as enhancers, when they complement gaze and pointing gestures in order to coordinate joint attention on visible objects, or as modality pointers, when joint attention needs to be shifted away from the whole object to one of its properties, say weight or texture. This multisensory approach to joint attention has important implications for social robotics, clinical diagnostics, pedagogy and theoretical debates on the construction of a shared world.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
From playing basketball to ordering at a food counter, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attention with others towards a common focus: we look at the ball, or point at a piece of cake. This non-verbal coordination of attention plays a fundamental role in our social lives: it ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language, understand each other’s mental states, and coordinate our actions. Models of joint attention generally attribute this accomplishment to gaze coordination. But are visual attentional mechanisms sufficient to achieve joint attention, in all cases? Besides cases where visual information is missing, we show how combining it with other senses can be helpful, and even necessary to certain uses of joint attention. We explain the two ways in which non-visual cues contribute to joint attention: either as enhancers, when they complement gaze and pointing gestures in order to coordinate joint attention on visible objects, or as modality pointers, when joint attention needs to be shifted away from the whole object to one of its properties, say weight or texture. This multisensory approach to joint attention has important implications for social robotics, clinical diagnostics, pedagogy and theoretical debates on the construction of a shared world.
Velasco, Pablo Fernandez; Loev, Slawa
Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account Journal Article
In: Synthese, vol. 198, pp. 10847-10882, 2020.
@article{Velasco2020,
title = {Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account},
author = {Pablo Fernandez Velasco and Slawa Loev},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-06-29},
journal = {Synthese},
volume = {198},
pages = {10847-10882},
abstract = {This paper aims to offer an account of affective experiences within Predictive Processing, a novel framework that considers the brain to be a dynamical, hierarchical, Bayesian hypothesis-testing mechanism. We begin by outlining a set of common features of affective experiences (or feelings) that a PP-theory should aim to explain: feelings are conscious, they have valence, they motivate behaviour, and they are intentional states with particular and formal objects. We then review existing theories of affective experiences within Predictive Processing and delineate two families of theories: Interoceptive Inference Theories (which state that feelings are determined by interoceptive predictions) and Error Dynamics Theories (which state that feelings are determined by properties of error dynamics). We highlight the strengths and shortcomings of each family of theories and develop a synthesis: the Affective Inference Theory. Affective Inference Theory claims that valence corresponds to the expected rate of prediction error reduction. In turn, the particular object of a feeling is the object predicted to be the most likely cause of expected changes in prediction error rate, and the formal object of a feeling is a predictive model of the expected changes in prediction error rate caused by a given particular object. Finally, our theory shows how affective experiences bias action selection, directing the organism towards allostasis and towards optimal levels of uncertainty in order to minimise prediction error over time.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This paper aims to offer an account of affective experiences within Predictive Processing, a novel framework that considers the brain to be a dynamical, hierarchical, Bayesian hypothesis-testing mechanism. We begin by outlining a set of common features of affective experiences (or feelings) that a PP-theory should aim to explain: feelings are conscious, they have valence, they motivate behaviour, and they are intentional states with particular and formal objects. We then review existing theories of affective experiences within Predictive Processing and delineate two families of theories: Interoceptive Inference Theories (which state that feelings are determined by interoceptive predictions) and Error Dynamics Theories (which state that feelings are determined by properties of error dynamics). We highlight the strengths and shortcomings of each family of theories and develop a synthesis: the Affective Inference Theory. Affective Inference Theory claims that valence corresponds to the expected rate of prediction error reduction. In turn, the particular object of a feeling is the object predicted to be the most likely cause of expected changes in prediction error rate, and the formal object of a feeling is a predictive model of the expected changes in prediction error rate caused by a given particular object. Finally, our theory shows how affective experiences bias action selection, directing the organism towards allostasis and towards optimal levels of uncertainty in order to minimise prediction error over time.
Garzorz, Isabelle; Deroy, Ophelia
Why There Is a Vestibular Sense, or How Metacognition Individuates the Senses Journal Article
In: Multisensory Research, vol. 1, pp. 1-20, 2020.
@article{nokey,
title = {Why There Is a Vestibular Sense, or How Metacognition Individuates the Senses},
author = {Isabelle Garzorz and Ophelia Deroy },
url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/msr/34/3/article-p261_3.xml},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/22134808-bja10026},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-06-25},
urldate = {2020-06-25},
journal = {Multisensory Research},
volume = {1},
pages = {1-20},
abstract = {Should the vestibular system be counted as a sense? This basic conceptual question remains surprisingly controversial. While it is possible to distinguish specific vestibular organs, it is not clear that this suffices to identify a genuine vestibular sense because of the supposed absence of a distinctive vestibular personal-level manifestation. The vestibular organs instead contribute to more general multisensory representations, whose name still suggest that they have a distinct ‘sensory’ contribution. The vestibular case shows a good example of the challenge of individuating the senses when multisensory interactions are the norm, neurally, representationally and phenomenally. Here, we propose that an additional metacognitive criterion can be used to single out a distinct sense, besides the existence of specific organs and despite the fact that the information coming from these organs is integrated with other sensory information. We argue that it is possible for human perceivers to monitor information coming from distinct organs, despite their integration, as exhibited and measured through metacognitive performance. Based on the vestibular case, we suggest that metacognitive awareness of the information coming from sensory organs constitutes a new criterion to individuate a sense through both physiological and personal criteria. This new way of individuating the senses accommodates both the specialised nature of sensory receptors as well as the intricate multisensory aspect of neural processes and experience, while maintaining the idea that each sense contributes something special to how we monitor the world and ourselves, at the subjective level.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Should the vestibular system be counted as a sense? This basic conceptual question remains surprisingly controversial. While it is possible to distinguish specific vestibular organs, it is not clear that this suffices to identify a genuine vestibular sense because of the supposed absence of a distinctive vestibular personal-level manifestation. The vestibular organs instead contribute to more general multisensory representations, whose name still suggest that they have a distinct ‘sensory’ contribution. The vestibular case shows a good example of the challenge of individuating the senses when multisensory interactions are the norm, neurally, representationally and phenomenally. Here, we propose that an additional metacognitive criterion can be used to single out a distinct sense, besides the existence of specific organs and despite the fact that the information coming from these organs is integrated with other sensory information. We argue that it is possible for human perceivers to monitor information coming from distinct organs, despite their integration, as exhibited and measured through metacognitive performance. Based on the vestibular case, we suggest that metacognitive awareness of the information coming from sensory organs constitutes a new criterion to individuate a sense through both physiological and personal criteria. This new way of individuating the senses accommodates both the specialised nature of sensory receptors as well as the intricate multisensory aspect of neural processes and experience, while maintaining the idea that each sense contributes something special to how we monitor the world and ourselves, at the subjective level.
Deroy, Ophelia
Evocation: How Mental Imagery Spans Across the Senses Book
Cambridge University Press, 2020.
@book{Deroy2020,
title = {Evocation: How Mental Imagery Spans Across the Senses},
author = {Ophelia Deroy},
editor = {Anna Abraham},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-handbook-of-the-imagination/evocation-how-mental-imagery-spans-across-the-senses/F4C56876776177E426C20EE8BB1388B9},
doi = { https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108580298.018},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-05-26},
booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination},
issuetitle = {from Part II - Imagery-Based Forms of the Imagination},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
abstract = {Listening to Wagner’s “Ride of the Valkyries” may lead us to imagine a scene of an army charging ; seeing Margaret Thatcher on a silent TV screen may make us imagine the sound of her voice; seeing a feather moving on the surface of a hand might make us almost feel the stroke on our own hand. All these cases may be accounted for under the category of crossmodal imagery: the occurrence of a conscious mental image in a given sensory modality, caused by the presentation of an object in another modality. This chapter shows why crossmodal imagery should be distinguished from mere neural activation across the senses and internally generated imagery, and restricts its definition to cases in which the mental image in an unstimulated modality is caused by another sensory stimulus, and its contents constrained by this stimulus. This more precise category of crossmodal imagery challenges us to re-examine several accepted claims in the domain of imagination: The induction of mental imagery does not necessarily follow modal paths, daydreaming might not be internally but externally generated by what we hear or feel, and non-visual imagery, which is often considered less frequent, may prove easier to induce crossmodally through visual, rather than through nonvisual stimulus.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
Listening to Wagner’s “Ride of the Valkyries” may lead us to imagine a scene of an army charging ; seeing Margaret Thatcher on a silent TV screen may make us imagine the sound of her voice; seeing a feather moving on the surface of a hand might make us almost feel the stroke on our own hand. All these cases may be accounted for under the category of crossmodal imagery: the occurrence of a conscious mental image in a given sensory modality, caused by the presentation of an object in another modality. This chapter shows why crossmodal imagery should be distinguished from mere neural activation across the senses and internally generated imagery, and restricts its definition to cases in which the mental image in an unstimulated modality is caused by another sensory stimulus, and its contents constrained by this stimulus. This more precise category of crossmodal imagery challenges us to re-examine several accepted claims in the domain of imagination: The induction of mental imagery does not necessarily follow modal paths, daydreaming might not be internally but externally generated by what we hear or feel, and non-visual imagery, which is often considered less frequent, may prove easier to induce crossmodally through visual, rather than through nonvisual stimulus.
Dezecache, Guillaume; Frith, Chris D.; Deroy, Ophelia
Pandemics and the great evolutionary mismatch Journal Article
In: Current Biology, vol. 30, iss. 10, no. PR417-R419, 2020.
@article{nokey,
title = {Pandemics and the great evolutionary mismatch},
author = {Guillaume Dezecache and Chris D. Frith and Ophelia Deroy},
url = {https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(20)30490-5?_returnURL=https%3A%2F%2Flinkinghub.elsevier.com%2Fretrieve%2Fpii%2FS0960982220304905%3Fshowall%3Dtrue#secsectitle0010},
doi = {DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2020.04.010},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-05-18},
urldate = {2020-05-18},
journal = {Current Biology},
volume = {30},
number = {PR417-R419},
issue = {10},
abstract = {The current covid-19 crisis is reopening some of the core questioning of psychology: how do humans behave in response to threat? Can they be urged to behave differently? Panic and selfish behaviour are usually thought to be the prevalent responses to perceived danger. However, people affiliate and seek social contact even more when exposed to a threat. These inclinations might have been adaptive in our evolutionary past: they are our most serious problem now.
What do humans do when faced with a collective threat? This is a core question for psychology and is of major practical concern for the covid-19 pandemic. But do we have anything useful to share with governments and the media, or is this just an attempt to persuade ourselves that we can make some contribution when we feel powerless in front of the spread of this virus?
We could simply retire to the ‘safety’ of our ivory towers and leave everyone else to worry, but the fact that we have a strong drive to do something tells a very different story from the one that still dominates the social and psychological sciences and the media. This is the idea that danger brings out the worst in us: panic, antisocial behaviour, and fierce competition for material and physical resources (see [1] for a review). Moral transgression and the abandonment of social norms may sometimes occur and certainly colour public imagination, but this behaviour tends to be rare. Sociological and psychological studies show that, under stress, people frequently remain calm and cooperative [1,2]. What’s more, rather than selfish avoidance, it is cooperation and contact-seeking that are our primary responses to threat [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
What increases in times of anxiety and threat is not a drive to help the self at all costs, but an intuitive drive to help others. The unfortunate consequence is that, in response to the current threat of infection, we desire social contact, particularly with the loved and the vulnerable.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The current covid-19 crisis is reopening some of the core questioning of psychology: how do humans behave in response to threat? Can they be urged to behave differently? Panic and selfish behaviour are usually thought to be the prevalent responses to perceived danger. However, people affiliate and seek social contact even more when exposed to a threat. These inclinations might have been adaptive in our evolutionary past: they are our most serious problem now.
What do humans do when faced with a collective threat? This is a core question for psychology and is of major practical concern for the covid-19 pandemic. But do we have anything useful to share with governments and the media, or is this just an attempt to persuade ourselves that we can make some contribution when we feel powerless in front of the spread of this virus?
We could simply retire to the ‘safety’ of our ivory towers and leave everyone else to worry, but the fact that we have a strong drive to do something tells a very different story from the one that still dominates the social and psychological sciences and the media. This is the idea that danger brings out the worst in us: panic, antisocial behaviour, and fierce competition for material and physical resources (see [1] for a review). Moral transgression and the abandonment of social norms may sometimes occur and certainly colour public imagination, but this behaviour tends to be rare. Sociological and psychological studies show that, under stress, people frequently remain calm and cooperative [1,2]. What’s more, rather than selfish avoidance, it is cooperation and contact-seeking that are our primary responses to threat [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
What increases in times of anxiety and threat is not a drive to help the self at all costs, but an intuitive drive to help others. The unfortunate consequence is that, in response to the current threat of infection, we desire social contact, particularly with the loved and the vulnerable.
Battich, Lucas; Geurts, Bart
Joint attention and perceptual experience Journal Article
In: Synthese, vol. 198, pp. 8809-8822, 2020.
@article{Battich2020,
title = {Joint attention and perceptual experience},
author = {Lucas Battich and Bart Geurts},
url = {https://cvbers.com/wp-admin/admin.php?page=teachpress%2Faddpublications.php},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02602-6},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-03-05},
urldate = {2020-03-05},
journal = {Synthese},
volume = {198},
pages = {8809-8822},
abstract = {Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent representative of the latter approach, and the main focus of this paper. We argue that Campbell’s theory is problematic for a variety of reasons, through which runs a common thread: most of the problems that the theory is faced with arise from the relational view of perception that he endorses, and, more generally, they suggest that perceptual experience is not sufficient for an analysis of joint attention.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent representative of the latter approach, and the main focus of this paper. We argue that Campbell’s theory is problematic for a variety of reasons, through which runs a common thread: most of the problems that the theory is faced with arise from the relational view of perception that he endorses, and, more generally, they suggest that perceptual experience is not sufficient for an analysis of joint attention.
Dowsett, James; Dieterich, Marianne; Taylor, Paul C. j.
Mobile steady-state evoked potential recording: Dissociable neural effects of real-world navigation and visual stimulation Journal Article
In: Journal of Neuroscience Methods, vol. 332, no. 108540, 2020.
@article{nokey,
title = {Mobile steady-state evoked potential recording: Dissociable neural effects of real-world navigation and visual stimulation},
author = {James Dowsett and Marianne Dieterich and Paul C.j. Taylor},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165027019303978?via%3Dihub},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2019.108540},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-02-15},
journal = {Journal of Neuroscience Methods},
volume = {332},
number = {108540},
abstract = {Abstract
Background
The ability to record brain activity in humans during movement, and in real world environments, is an important step towards understanding cognition. Electroencephalography (EEG) is well suited to mobile applications but suffers from the problem of artefacts introduced into the signal during movement. Steady state visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs) give an excellent signal-to-noise ratio and averaging a sufficient number of trials will eventually remove any noise not phase locked to the visual flicker.
New Method
Here we present a method for producing SSVEPs of real world environments using modified LCD shutter glasses, which are commonly used for 3D TV, by adapting the glass to flicker at neurophysiologically relevant frequencies (alpha band). Participants viewed a room whilst standing and walking. Either the left or right side of the room was illuminated, to test if it is possible to recover the resulting SSVEPs when walking, as well as to probe the effect of walking on neural activity. Additionally, by using a signal generator to produce “simulated SSVEPs” on the scalp we can demonstrate that this method is able to accurately recover evoked neural responses during walking.
Results
The amplitude of SSVEPs over right parietal cortex was reduced by walking. Furthermore, the waveform and phase of the SSVEPs is highly preserved between walking and standing, but was sensitive to whether the left or right side of the room was illuminated.
Conclusions
This method allows probing neural responses during natural movements within real environments, potentially at a wide range of frequencies.
},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Abstract
Background
The ability to record brain activity in humans during movement, and in real world environments, is an important step towards understanding cognition. Electroencephalography (EEG) is well suited to mobile applications but suffers from the problem of artefacts introduced into the signal during movement. Steady state visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs) give an excellent signal-to-noise ratio and averaging a sufficient number of trials will eventually remove any noise not phase locked to the visual flicker.
New Method
Here we present a method for producing SSVEPs of real world environments using modified LCD shutter glasses, which are commonly used for 3D TV, by adapting the glass to flicker at neurophysiologically relevant frequencies (alpha band). Participants viewed a room whilst standing and walking. Either the left or right side of the room was illuminated, to test if it is possible to recover the resulting SSVEPs when walking, as well as to probe the effect of walking on neural activity. Additionally, by using a signal generator to produce “simulated SSVEPs” on the scalp we can demonstrate that this method is able to accurately recover evoked neural responses during walking.
Results
The amplitude of SSVEPs over right parietal cortex was reduced by walking. Furthermore, the waveform and phase of the SSVEPs is highly preserved between walking and standing, but was sensitive to whether the left or right side of the room was illuminated.
Conclusions
This method allows probing neural responses during natural movements within real environments, potentially at a wide range of frequencies.
Mastropasqua, Angela; Dowsett, James; Dieterich, Marianne; Taylor, Paul C. J.
Right frontal eye field has perceptual and oculomotor functions during optokinetic stimulation and nystagmus Journal Article
In: Journal of Neurophysiology, vol. 123, iss. 2, pp. 571-586, 2020.
@article{Mastropasqua2020,
title = {Right frontal eye field has perceptual and oculomotor functions during optokinetic stimulation and nystagmus},
author = {Angela Mastropasqua and James Dowsett and Marianne Dieterich and Paul C.J. Taylor},
url = {https://journals.physiology.org/doi/full/10.1152/jn.00468.2019},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00468.2019},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-02-04},
urldate = {2020-02-04},
journal = {Journal of Neurophysiology},
volume = {123},
issue = {2},
pages = {571-586},
abstract = {Abstract
The right frontal eye field (rFEF) is associated with visual perception and eye movements. rFEF is activated during optokinetic nystagmus (OKN), a reflex that moves the eye in response to visual motion (optokinetic stimulation, OKS). It remains unclear whether rFEF plays causal perceptual and/or oculomotor roles during OKS and OKN. To test this, participants viewed a leftward-moving visual scene of vertical bars and judged whether a flashed dot was moving. Single pulses of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) were applied to rFEF on half of trials. In half of blocks, to explore oculomotor control, participants performed an OKN in response to the OKS. rFEF TMS, during OKN, made participants more accurate on trials when the dot was still, and it slowed eye movements. In separate blocks, participants fixated during OKS. This not only controlled for eye movements but also allowed the use of EEG to explore the FEF’s role in visual motion discrimination. In these blocks, by contrast, leftward dot motion discrimination was impaired, associated with a disruption of the frontal-posterior balance in alpha-band oscillations. None of these effects occurred in a control site (M1) experiment. These results demonstrate multiple related yet dissociable causal roles of the right FEF during optokinetic stimulation.
NEW & NOTEWORTHY This study demonstrates causal roles of the right frontal eye field (FEF) in motion discrimination and eye movement control during visual scene motion: previous work had only examined other stimuli and eye movements such as saccades. Using combined transcranial magnetic stimulation and EEG and a novel optokinetic stimulation motion-discrimination task, we find evidence for multiple related yet dissociable causal roles within the FEF: perceptual processing during optokinetic stimulation, generation of the optokinetic nystagmus, and the maintenance of alpha oscillations.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Abstract
The right frontal eye field (rFEF) is associated with visual perception and eye movements. rFEF is activated during optokinetic nystagmus (OKN), a reflex that moves the eye in response to visual motion (optokinetic stimulation, OKS). It remains unclear whether rFEF plays causal perceptual and/or oculomotor roles during OKS and OKN. To test this, participants viewed a leftward-moving visual scene of vertical bars and judged whether a flashed dot was moving. Single pulses of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) were applied to rFEF on half of trials. In half of blocks, to explore oculomotor control, participants performed an OKN in response to the OKS. rFEF TMS, during OKN, made participants more accurate on trials when the dot was still, and it slowed eye movements. In separate blocks, participants fixated during OKS. This not only controlled for eye movements but also allowed the use of EEG to explore the FEF’s role in visual motion discrimination. In these blocks, by contrast, leftward dot motion discrimination was impaired, associated with a disruption of the frontal-posterior balance in alpha-band oscillations. None of these effects occurred in a control site (M1) experiment. These results demonstrate multiple related yet dissociable causal roles of the right FEF during optokinetic stimulation.
NEW & NOTEWORTHY This study demonstrates causal roles of the right frontal eye field (FEF) in motion discrimination and eye movement control during visual scene motion: previous work had only examined other stimuli and eye movements such as saccades. Using combined transcranial magnetic stimulation and EEG and a novel optokinetic stimulation motion-discrimination task, we find evidence for multiple related yet dissociable causal roles within the FEF: perceptual processing during optokinetic stimulation, generation of the optokinetic nystagmus, and the maintenance of alpha oscillations.
2015
Deroy, Ophelia; Reade, Ben; Spence, Charles
The insectivore’s dilemma, and how to take the West out of it Journal Article
In: Food Quality and Preference, vol. 44, pp. 44–55, 2015.
@article{deroy2015insectivore,
title = {The insectivore’s dilemma, and how to take the West out of it},
author = {Ophelia Deroy and Ben Reade and Charles Spence},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-01},
journal = {Food Quality and Preference},
volume = {44},
pages = {44--55},
publisher = {Elsevier},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
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